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BET17ER THAN NO TEETH AT ALL?
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL*

It feels more than a bit peculiar to be asked to write something
for the fiftieth anniversary of this or any law review. True, I have
twice before discussed the subject of law reviews.' But the first
time, I defended student run law reviews on the twin grounds that it
was a waste of faculty time to edit such journals and that fancy law
firms would never let them die because the existence of the law review credential reduced the cost of recruiting (and maybe of training) new associates. The second time I explained the awful boring
sameness of the law reviews as a reflection of the awful boring sameness of law school courses, which I ascribed to the failure of the law
professoriat to develop a professional identity different from that
served up by Christopher Columbus Landgell over one hundred
years ago. These are hardly encomia of the kind that qualify one for
the performance of the celebratory offerings usually expected on an
occasion such as this, at least unless, "Well, they're better than no
teeth at all," is an encomium for false teeth. But this journal's editor, for whatever reason, managed to flatter the guerrilla/gorilla in
me and so I hereby offer my unorthodox congratulations to the
Maryland Law Review on its fiftieth anniversary:
Hope the neqt fifty are better than the last.
Now do not misunderstand my peculiar greeting. I would
surely offer some version of it to any law review in the United States,
so this journal is not being singled out for adverse comment. Indeed, Robert Maynard Hutchins, boy dean of the Yale Law School,
once told me that in fifty years as a reader of both the Columbia and
Yale journals he could notice no change in the one and only an occasional, extremely modest change in the other. The school magazine, as a friend euphemistically calls it, is a durable format.
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, State University of New York, Buffalo.
B.A., Northwestern University, 1964;J.D., University of Chicago, 1967. This piece is for
Fred Rodell, whom I never knew, but who got it right, more often than not. In his
memory I have followed, as best I can, his strictures on style and form. Footnotes have
been inserted by dutiful editors. They believe that someone might find them useful; I do

not.I
1. Schlegel, Revenge or Moon (Over) Your Law School, 40J.
Schlegel, An Endangered Species?, 36J. LEGAL EDUC. 18 (1986).
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At the same time, a modest amount of individual censure ought
to be noted, for in a very technical sense the Maryland Law Review
has been reckless in proceeding down well worn paths. At the outset-volume 1, number 1-the Law Review was presented with a
solid critique of that well worn path, adverted to it (the essence of
recklessness) and proceeded forward anyway. By recounting this
behavior I mean to note that in the year of the publication of the
first issue came also the publication of Fred Rodell's scathing critique of the institution, "Good-bye to Law Reviews. "2 That publication was duly noted and editorially commented on in the first issue
of this law review.' Rodell's was not the first criticism of the institution; one might find in Karl Llewellyn's ground breaking criticism of
the American law school, "On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal
Education," 4 an earlier trenchant criticism of the institution in his
comment that he was publishing a speech given at the Harvard Law
School in the Columbia Law Review because "as on other occasions
... [the HarvardLaw Review's] canons of taste and policy did not jibe
with mine." 5 But Rodell said it noisier and classier than Llewellyn
and only a year later, so it is his criticism that merited attention.
And what was that criticism? In declining to contribute further
to "the qualitatively moribund while quantitatively mushroom-like
literature of the law," Rodell observed: "There are two things
wrong with almost all legal writing. One is its style. The other is its
content." 6 Although that about covers the waterfront, he nevertheless added: "The average law review writer is peculiarly able to say
nothing with an air of great importance." 7
Rodell's complaints about style might be grouped as objections
to the mock dignity of a prose form that makes it difficult to offer a
forthright opinion in the first person or to treat pompous behavior
with the real humor that it deserves, and to the pointless nature of
the footnote tradition. The result, said Rodell, was that "the straitjacket of law review style has killed what might have been a lively
literature .... A man who writes a law review article should be able
to attract for it a slightly larger audience than a few of his colleagues
who skim through it out of courtesy and a few of his students who
2. Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936).
3. See Editorial,A Symposium on Law Retiews in a NeighboringJournal, 1 MD. L. REV. 59
(1936).
4. Uewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 651
(1935).
5. Id. at n.0.
6. Rodell, supra note 2, at 38.
7. d.
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sweat through it because he has assigned it.""
Rodell's complaint about substance was simply that since "law
. . . [was] the only alternative to force as a means of solving the
myriad problems of the world," 9 the lawyers might focus their writing on those problems rather than on "the slinging together of neat
(but certainly not gaudy) legalistic arguments and the building up,
rebuilding, and sporadic knocking down of pretty houses of theory
foundationed in sand and false assumptions."' l0 This travesty called
scholarship-which avoids realizing that "law is supposed to be a
device for serving society"' l -Rodell explained by the observation
that the professors who write the articles get professional advancement from the effort, the students get fancy jobs, and the law firms
free research.'

2

It is hard to fault Rodell's analysis, though it could be strengthened by noting that the canons of law review style promote a false
objectivity associated with the rule of law seen as the law of rules;
that law review substance discusses legal rules, the stuff of this understanding of the rule of law, not problems or devices for serving
society; and that the law professors have a professional identity
rooted in this understanding that is made problematical when attempts are made to move the form beyond the discussion of legal
rules. But the more interesting thing is the response of the editor of
this journal in 1936 to Rodell's arguments. Passing off the question
of style as simply a matter of good manners in delate and a reflection of the dignity of the law school named on the mast head, the
editor avoided the question of substance entirely but instead focused on Rodell's objection to providing free research for law firms.
He defended this practical effect with the rhetorical nonsequitur
that a firm's use of a review writer's research itselfjustified the existence of that review.'" So, zero for three, the Maryland Law Review
marched into the future.
A more revealing set of responses would be hard to find. Unable to deal with crucial questions of substance, the editor chose to
treat the question of form as one of pure form, or "good manners"
(and thus, in addition, to ignore Rodell's recognition that "content

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 41.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 44-45.
See Editorial, supra note 3, at 61-62.
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helps to determine style" 14) and to treat the claim of meretricious
behavior on the part of all concerned by standing it on its head. In
so indulging in pure pleader's trickery he (for the writer was surely
John S. Strahorn, Jr., the faculty editor) silently affirmed the traditional content of the law review and the underlying ideological centrality of that content, for it is our most deeply held assumptions,
those things that could not be otherwise, that we find most difficult
to defend. Thus, it is not surprising that this first volume should
contain such gems as "Latent Equities in Maryland" and "Revocation of a Will by Birth of a Child." Even more enlightening is an
article with the sexy title "Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Motorists
for Suits Arising from Local Accidents." This article actually identifies a real social problem--exactly as Rodell would wish-then
spends most of its effort treating constitutional law as rules to be
applied, rather than attempting to understand why it was that such a
simple and obvious problem had become such a big deal-a classic
example of forest and trees.
Was Robert Hutchins' observation correct? IVlow much better
have law reviews become in fifty years? To answer that question I
grabbed the last bound volume of the Maryland Law Review on my
library's shelves-volume 48. If change is to count as better, some
changes can be seen quite quickly. For example, the discussion of
Maryland law, the "essentially local" topic that the editor of volume
1, number 1 thought should be the "subject matter" of the Law Review, has now been consigned to the student's notes and comments.
"Matters of general law," which were to be "handled only because
of their local interest," are now the quarterly grist of the articles
section and are slipping into the comments section, if not the notes.
Book reviews have somewhat bewilderingly disappeared, a sad state
of affairs since, as Rodell recognized, they were in 1936, and are
now, the liveliest and most uninhibited of the law review art forms.
But what of style and substance and the social conditions of use?
As to style, little has changed, much less for the better. Footnoting has clearly gotten worse as big piles of text in eight point
type now litter a quarter to a third of most pages where fifty years
ago such excess was relatively uncommon. And although Avi Soifer
is permitted to use "I," at least in a transcribed speech, most other
work seems to be the result of automatic writing by "this article,"
which is possessed of "The Law." Even the exception, the committee that is allowed an impersonal "should"-not "we believe," but a
14. Rodell, supra note 4, at'42.
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"should"-is interesting; perhaps it is a matter of strength in numbers or the security of an inter-disciplinary perspective that makes
the difference. And of course "manners" still dictate that all prose
written specifically for a review be as interesting as watching paint
dry. Here, whatever the wine, there are no new bottles.
As for substance there has been one highly significant changea shift from private to public law as the central focus of law review
scholarship, a shift that can even be seen in the section labeled "Developments in Maryland Law, 1987-88." It would seem that Rodell's criticism is being followed as we set our collective sights on
AIDS, capital punishment, and capital redeployment. But even a
cursory reading of materials on these topics would demonstrate that
it is not new wine in the old bottles either. In the face of a massive
epidemic with devastating effects on one of our most vulnerable
communities and enormous continuing costs for treatment, the Law
Review chooses to discuss whether there is a duty to warn patients
that their health care provider is HIV positive and conversely
whether such providers have a duty to warn individuals in varying
relationships with HIV positive patients that they may be potentially
at risk. Talk about straightening the pictures while the Titanic goes
down. Similarly, it is hard to deny that defendants in capital cases
need counsel in post-conviction proceedings. But to discuss this
question without centering on the great social forces that are attempting to re-institute capital punishment in the United States and
the way that legal doctrine is being used to retard that attempt, perhaps even to the point of increasing antagonism towards the procedural safeguards that make up this body of doctrine, is to assume
law's imperviousness to such forces, a position that should have
been pass, at least after Lord Bryce. And the notion that race and
age discrimination law are likely to be potent or even significant
forces in retarding corporate decisions to redeploy capital is to have
spent too much time thinking about the little Dutch boy with his
finger in the dike.
Now, what is going on here? No one would deny that these
three problems are among the more significant in our society. But
look at the law review writer's response to each. It's like the high
school geek who thinks that the right shoes, the right shirt, and the
perfect shades make cool. Association with important social
problems may bring a kind of indirectly reflected glory, but it is no
substitute for cool, and cool in this context is scholarship that tries
to help us understand how law-not rules but law, a complex inter-
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play of rules, institutions, social givenness and power-is being, or
might be used with respect to each problem.
Try these understandings, for example. Our response to the
AIDS epidemic is deeply bound up in our fear and loathing of homosexual sexual practices and drug users-that is, what abstinence
versus condoms, and "just say no" versus free, clean needles means.
The law wanders blithely on and lets treatment costs escalate in the
name of patent protection, that is to say property rights, in ways that
would never have been allowed had Jonas Salk tried to price his polio vaccine at six hundred dollars per dose. This use of law merits
discussion.
Capital punishment is about the fear, perhaps justified, of the
middle class that the lower class, particularly the black lower class, is
without sufficient informal mechanisms of social control. This is
why the relatively easiest issue (even in New York, a moderately
anti-capital punishment state) is about killing cops and guards; they
are the tenuous front line of our official, that is, our in-default,
mechanism for social control. Whether it is sensible to ignore that
fear, indeed to use law without regard to the existence of that fear,
raises profound questions about whether the law as rule can in fact
undercut the rule of law. That issue merits discussion.
Capital redeployment is an ongoing problem in any society
where technological innovation is rapid and becomes even more serious when improvements in global transportation and in local education make rapid industrialization of the third world a viable
economic step. And such redeployment is most likely to affect racial
and aging minorities because they get the most economically marginal employment-the employment most liable to suffer the adverse
effects of such redeployment. The use of concepts of property and
privateness to externalize the costs of redeployment on employees
rather than to recognize them as a cost of government industrial
policy is a fascinating re-enactment of the nineteenth century industrial revolution, which was similarly paid for, in part, by (different)
minority employees. This too merits discussion as did the development of an economy of intangibles and the transformation of social
relationships attendant to the widespread availability of cheap, personal transportation in 1936.'5
But the important thing to notice is that in the 1980s as in the
15. I can see no great issue underlying discussion of the revocation of a will by the
later birth of a child, a topic that surely invokes only the timeless struggle between
greedy, disaffected relatives. The law has always been bewildered in the face of such
disputes. Latent equities are life's revenge on the tidy world of the conveyancer.
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1930s this Review does not discuss the important questions but
stands, geek-like, hoping that being seen close to Patrick Swayze will
be enough to hide the fact that it is not Jennifer Gray but Plain Jane
Gray on its arm. I suggest that consulting the library withdrawal
records for any bound law review volume will quickly disclose the
date's true identity.
Now let me say again that I do not mean to single out the Maryland Law Review or its contributors for excoriation. The law reviews
at the "fancy" schoolA are just as derelict and even more pompous
and self-important. The authors whose work I have commented on
are all competent, occasionally inspired legal technicians. But that
is the problem. A friend who recruits for a large Washington law
firm puts it bluntly when he says, "I don't want associates who can
think like a lawyer; I want associates who can think like a client!"
Similarly we do not need technical articles exploring more doctrinal
crochets or turning policy analysis into technical economics or just
more doctrine. We need articles that help us understand how and
why law is being used. We need the discussions I have asked for,
not more of the discussions I have read.
And why don't we get them? Well, the social conditions of the
law review have not changed since Rodell wrote. The law professors still want advancement, the law students still want better jobs,
and the law firms still want a little bit of free research-thinking like
a lawyer is really dispensable if you can go to a ready source of arguments. I have explained why this is so elsewhere and by now
benumbingly. It is the ideology of the rule of law as the law of rules
that keeps law professors at their boring tasks, that reproduces
those tasks for law students, and that provides the public face for
practitioners, who of all people know better. And so my unorthodox congratulations, for while there is every reason to believe that
there will be fifty more volumes of the MarylandLaw Review there is
no particularly good reason to believe that the next fifty will be any
better than the past.
Still, I started my congratulations with a peculiar word"hope." Several years ago, when I composed the first of my series
of jeremiads about legal education, a faculty member at the school
where I delivered it commented that it seemed as if I were preparing
to leave law teaching. I was appalled at such a misunderstanding.
One can only get this angry about something one cares passionately
about. So I bring you my congratulations with hope. So long as law
professors will listen, so long as student editors will hear, there is
hope-hope that law reviews will one day be full of articles about
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law and not articles about legal rules. And, yes, the Maryland Law
Review can start on its own. It does not need to wait for Harvard or
Yale or Stanford. History teaches that revolutions break out in the
strangest places. Remember what Fred Rodell had to say and do
not make the same reckless error twice. Take one little step. Instead of candles put copies of A Uniform System of Citation on your
birthday cake. Then burn them all. No teeth may in fact be better
than false ones.

